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1 
A FOX IN THE HENHOUSE: APPLYING 
CALIFORNIA’S DELAYED DISCOVERY RULE IN 
FEDERAL COURT 
Samuel Donohue 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  Statutes of Limitations and the Delayed Discovery Rule 
“‘Statute of limitations’ is the ‘collective term . . . commonly 
applied to a great number of acts,’ or parts of acts, that ‘prescribe the 
periods beyond which’ a plaintiff may not bring a cause of action” or 
claim.1 As a general rule, plaintiffs are barred from asserting a claim 
after the statute of limitations applicable to that claim has run. The 
moment at which a statute of limitations begins to run, or “accrues,” 
is particular to each claim. If, for example, the statute of limitations 
for a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is twelve months, a 
plaintiff will have twelve months (the prescribed time period) from the 
occurrence of the alleged breach (the “accrual” event) to file suit. If 
she fails to do so, the plaintiff’s cause of action becomes stale, and she 
is thus precluded from asserting it.2 
Courts interpret statutes of limitations strictly, and are loathe to 
alter the time period established by such a statute in a manner 
inconsistent with the will of the legislature.3 However, many 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science & 
Spanish, summa cum laude, Seattle University, 2016. My deepest gratitude to Professor Simona 
Grossi, whose passion for procedure is contagious—thank you for your mentorship and for always 
encouraging me to strive. I would also like to thank my colleagues on the Loyola of Los Angeles 
Law Review for their hard work and dedication.  
 1. Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 981 P.2d 79, 86 (Cal. 1999); see also Statute of Limitations, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining a statute of limitations as “a statute establishing 
a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury 
occurred or was discovered)”). 
 2. For a discussion of the general purposes of statutes of limitation, see James R. MacAyeal, 
The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine as Exceptions to the Statute of 
Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589, 590–92 (1996). 
 3. See, eg., Norgart, 981 P.2d at 87 (“To establish any [particular limitations] period under 
any . . . statute belongs to the legislature alone subject only to Constitutional restraints.”); Am. Pipe 
(6)52.1_DONOHUE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2019  9:55 PM 
2 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1 
jurisdictions recognize an exception to this general rule, commonly 
known as the “discovery rule,” or the “delayed discovery rule.”4 
Though federal courts apply the “delayed discovery doctrine” to 
various categories of federal claims,5 the Supreme Court has rejected 
the notion that the discovery rule applies to all statutes of limitations 
in all contexts.6  
In contrast to the federal judiciary, California courts have adopted  
a delayed discovery rule that is more broadly applicable.7 Under 
California law, the delayed discovery rule “postpones [the] accrual of 
a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, 
the cause of action.”8 California law also places the burden of proving 
the applicability of the discovery rule on plaintiffs.9 In Fox v. Ethicon 
Endo-Surgery, Inc.,10 the California Supreme Court held that to invoke 
the discovery rule, “[a] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face 
that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule 
must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of 
discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite 
reasonable diligence.”11 
Thus, under Fox, a plaintiff need only address the discovery rule 
at the pleading stage when his “complaint shows on its face that his 
 
& Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 559 (1974) (recognizing “the power of the federal courts to 
hold that the statute of limitations is tolled under certain circumstances not inconsistent with the 
legislative purpose.”). 
 4. See Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 U.S. at 595. 
        5.   See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 27 (2001) (listing cases of fraud, latent disease, 
and medical malpractice as the “only [categories of] cases in which the Court has recognized a 
prevailing discovery rule”). 
        6.   SCA Hygiene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prod., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 962 
(2017) (“While some claims are subject to a ‘discovery rule’ under which the limitations period 
begins when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury giving rise to the claim, 
that is not a universal feature of statutes of limitations.”). But see Lyons v. Michael & Assocs., 
824 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 
F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[F]ederal law determines when the limitations period begins to 
run, and the general federal rule is that ‘a limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff 
knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.’”).  
        7.   See KATHLEEN M. BANKE & JOHN L. SEGAL, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL 
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL,STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, Ch. 3 (2019) (listing sixteen 
“commonly-encountered claims for which, by statute or case law, accrual is delayed until plaintiff 
discovers the facts essential to the claim.”).  
 8. Norgart, 981 P.2d at 88. 
 9. Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 110 P.3d 914, 921 (Cal. 2005) (quoting McKelvey v. 
Boeing N. Am., Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
 10.  110 P.3d 914 (Cal. 2005). 
 11. Id. at 920–21 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting McKelvey, 86 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 651). 
(6)52.1_DONOHUE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2019  9:55 PM 
2018] CALIFORNIA’S FOX STANDARD IN FEDERAL COURT 3 
claim would” otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.12 In 
such a case, a plaintiff must allege two elements to invoke the delayed 
discovery rule: “(1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the 
inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable 
diligence.”13 And finally, at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must plead 
the facts that establish these two elements with specificity.14 
B.  Application of California’s Delayed Discovery Rule 
in Federal Court 
In California Sansome Co. v. U.S. Gypsum,15 decided in 1995, the 
Ninth Circuit considered the application of California’s delayed 
discovery rule in federal court.  The court cited to a 1991 California 
Court of Appeals case that espoused an earlier version of the delayed 
discovery rule later adopted by the California Supreme Court in Fox. 
The California Sansome Co. court declared, without further 
discussion, that “California law makes clear that a plaintiff must allege 
specific facts establishing the applicability of the discovery-rule 
exception.”16 In short, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the “specific facts” 
pleading standard from Fox without critically engaging with the 
ramifications of that endorsement.17 
Since Fox, the delayed discovery standard has been applied by 
federal district courts in California alone on more than 200 
occasions.18 Application of the Fox standard in federal court raises two 
important questions, both largely unanswered by the district courts 
that apply it. The first is whether a plaintiff in federal court is required 
to “specifically plead facts” pertaining to the delayed discovery rule 
in order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The second is whether 
 
 12. Id. at 920–21. 
 13. Id. at 921 (emphasis omitted) (quoting McKelvey, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 160). 
 14. Id. 
 15. 55 F.3d 1402 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 16. Id. at 1407 (emphasis added) (citing CAMSI IV v. Hunter Tech. Corp., 282 Cal. Rptr. 80, 
86–87 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
 17. Although California’s delayed discovery rule jurisprudence predates 2005, Fox, decided 
that year, describes the contours of the rule in its modern form. For convenience, this Note uses 
“the Fox standard” to refer to the rule announced in Fox, even though California courts applied a 
similar standard prior to 2005. 
 18. See Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., Citing References, WESTLAW, https://1.next.west 
law.com/Link/RelatedInformation/DocHeadnoteLink?docGuid=Ic636cfb326c311daaea49302b5f
61a35&headnoteId=200656713601320100105001014&originationContext=document&docSourc
e=24c5cd58636b4f3fb026b04a4831abd9&rank=6&transitionType=CitingReferences&contextDa
ta=(sc.History*oc.UserEnteredCitation) (last visited Mar. 12, 2018). 
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it is ever appropriate to require a plaintiff in federal court to plead 
compliance with the statute of limitations. Generally, in federal court, 
a complaint need only include a “short and plain statement of the 
claim” to survive a motion to dismiss,19 and the burden of raising the 
statute of limitations defense is on the defendant.20  
Strong v. Cochran,21 a recent case from the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, considered both of these questions. In 
Strong, the plaintiff asserted various claims, including a California 
securities law claim.22 One of the defendants moved to dismiss that 
claim, arguing that the it was time-barred by the statute of limitations, 
and that the plaintiff had failed to plead the elements of the delayed 
discovery rule with the specificity required by Fox.23 The court flatly 
refused to apply the Fox standard for two reasons. First, the court 
found that Fox’s requirement that a plaintiff “specifically plead facts” 
amounted to a heightened pleading standard, and thus, application of 
the Fox standard violates the Erie doctrine.24 Second, the court found 
that “expiration of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense,” 
and thus should not be considered at the pleading stage.25 This Note 
uses Strong as a point of departure, and asserts that the Strong court 
was correct as to its application of the Erie doctrine, but incorrect as 
to its conclusion that the applicability of the discovery rule should not 
be considered at the pleading stage. 
Part II of this Note illustrates the differences between California’s 
code pleading system and the federal notice pleading system. It also 
provides a brief survey of federal cases in which courts applied 
California’s delayed discovery rule. Part III demonstrates that under 
the Erie doctrine, Fox’s “specifically plead facts” requirement does 
not apply in federal court. Part III also demonstrates that the federal 
pleading standard in Rule 8(a)(2) is not susceptible to ad hoc judicial 
alteration. Part IV argues that under the Erie doctrine, the Delegation 
 
 19. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & 
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (noting that Rule 8 governs all pleadings in federal 
court, with limited exception). 
 20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any 
avoidance or affirmative defense.”); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (refusing to 
“impos[e] on the plaintiff an obligation to anticipate . . . a defense . . . in his complaint”). 
 21. No. 2:14-cv-788-TC, 2017 WL 4620984 (D. Utah, Oct. 13, 2017). 
 22. Id. at *5 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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doctrine, and United States Supreme Court precedent, Fox’s pleading 
standard has no place in federal court. Part V argues that, although 
federal courts should not follow Fox’s pleading standard, they should 
follow Fox in placing the burden of pleading the elements of the 
delayed discovery rule on plaintiffs. Part VI offers concluding 
remarks. 
II.  THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CALIFORNIA’S CODE PLEADING 
SYSTEM AND THE FEDERAL NOTICE PLEADING SYSTEM 
Although this Note’s primary focus is on the pleading standard 
applicable to California’s delayed discovery rule in federal courts, a 
brief overview of the fundamental differences between California’s 
general pleading standard and the federal pleading standard embodied 
in Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a 
helpful framework for the analysis. 
A.  Code Pleading and the Delayed Discovery Rule 
The California Supreme Court has established that, in order to 
rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a “cause of action, 
‘[a] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would 
be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically 
plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the 
inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable 
diligence.’”26 The Fox court also held that “conclusory allegations will 
not withstand demurrer.”27 These judge-made rules operate in relation 
to the California Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Section 425.10(a)(1) of the California Civil Procedure Code 
instructs that a complaint must contain “a statement of facts 
constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.”28 
Further, under California’s code pleading system, a plaintiff must state 
ultimate facts, i.e. “those factual propositions on which liability will 
be directly established,” in order to state a cause of action.29 Although 
California’s code pleading system is less formalistic and demanding 
than the pure fact-pleading systems that used to be common 
 
 26. Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 110 P.3d 914, 920–21 (Cal. 2005) (alteration in 
original). 
 27. Id. at 921. 
 28. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.10(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 29. See ALLAN IDES ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND PROBLEMS 20 (5th ed. 2016). 
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throughout the country,30 its focus on pleading “ultimate facts” 
continues to distinguish it from the less demanding notice pleading 
system upon which the Federal Rules are premised. 
B.  The Federal Pleading Standard 
Pleadings in the federal system are governed by a more lenient 
notice pleading standard. The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1938 was, in large part, a rejection of the rigid, 
formalistic fact pleading systems that were prevalent among state and 
federal courts at the time.31 At the center of the notice pleading system 
is the claim. The definition of a “claim,” as understood by the authors 
of the Federal Rules, is “a group of operative facts giving rise to one 
or more rights of action.”32 The purpose of pleadings in a notice 
pleading system, as the name implies, is to put the defendant on notice 
of the plaintiff’s claim.33 This purpose is reflected in Rule 8(a)(2)’s 
straightforward declaration that, to state a claim, a complaint need 
only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim.”34 
Thus, there are, at least in theory, significant differences between 
California’s code pleading system and the federal notice pleading 
system. The former puts the onus on the plaintiffs to plead ultimate 
facts, whereas the latter is designed to ensure that plaintiffs provide 
defendants with notice of the nature of the suit against which they must 
defend. Preserving the federal notice pleading system requires that 
federal courts not blur the lines between notice pleading and code 
pleading. To this end, longstanding Supreme Court precedent 
mandates that federal courts apply the federal pleading standard in 
almost every conceivable case. 
III.  THE UNYIELDING NATURE OF NOTICE PLEADING 
Rule 8(a)(2) generally applies to all federal claims,35 with but a 
few exceptions.36 This section discusses three fundamental reasons 
 
 30. See id. at 21. 
 31. See id. at 31. 
 32. See id. at 13 (quoting CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 
477 (2d ed. 1947)). 
 33. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[Rule] 8(a)(2) requires only 
‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to 
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”). 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 35. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). 
 36. See infra text accompanying notes 89–92. 
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why Rule 8(a)(2), not the Fox pleading standard, governs discovery 
rule pleadings in federal court. The first is rooted in the Erie doctrine, 
the second in the Delegation doctrine, and the third in the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit.37 
A. The Erie Doctrine and Notice Pleading 
In Strong v. Cochran, the court concluded that, “under standard 
Erie doctrine, state pleading requirements, so far as they are concerned 
with the degree of detail to be alleged, are irrelevant in federal court 
even as to claims arising under state law.”38 The following discussion 
of the Erie doctrine and analysis of the conflict between the Fox 
standard and Rule 8(a)(2) demonstrate that the Strong court was 
correct. 
In the seminal case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,39 the 
Supreme Court held that, “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal 
Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case 
is the law of the state.”40 This statement is at the core of what came to 
be known as the Erie doctrine. The Erie doctrine stands for a simple 
and practical proposition: “a federal court sitting in diversity should 
apply state substantive law to the resolution of the state claims 
presented to it.”41 A related and similarly straightforward proposition 
is that federal courts are to apply constitutionally valid federal 
procedural law, regardless of the source of the underlying substantive 
law.42 
Thus, when a state law and a federal procedural law conflict, the 
federal procedural law will apply unless it is unconstitutional. This 
result is required by both practical and constitutional concerns. As a 
practical matter, the application of a unified body of procedural law in 
federal courts is conducive to the fair and efficient adjudication of 
cases. Such uniformity promotes fairness insofar as it puts litigants in 
federal court on notice of the procedural rules that will govern their 
 
 37. 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
 38. Strong v. Cochran, No. 2:14-cv-788-TC, 2017 WL 4620984, at *5 (D. Utah, Oct. 13, 2017) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Andresen v. Diorio, 349 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 2003)). 
 39. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 40. Id. at 78. 
 41. See IDES ET AL., supra note 29, at 465. 
 42. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (“Under the Erie 
doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.”). 
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cases, and promotes efficiency insofar as it saves federal courts from 
having to consider which body of procedural law applies on a case by 
case basis. And as a matter of constitutional law, the Supremacy 
Clause43 dictates that where a state law and a valid federal law conflict, 
the latter must prevail.44 
1.  The Scope of the Erie Doctrine 
When an Erie issue arises, a federal court should resolve the issue 
by asking: “First, is there truly a conflict between the federal 
procedural law at issue and some provision of state law? And, second, 
assuming there is such a conflict, is the federal law valid?”45 If there 
is no conflict, then both the state law and the federal procedural law 
apply. However, if the court finds a conflict, it must then determine 
whether the federal procedural rule is constitutionally valid. The 
nature of this inquiry depends on the source of the procedural rule in 
question.46 To determine whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is 
valid, the court must decide whether the rule in question is in 
compliance with the Rules Enabling Act, discussed below.  
 
2.  Erie Applied 
a)  Is there a conflict? 
To determine whether federal district courts should apply the Fox 
standard when considering California’s discovery rule, the first step is 
to determine whether there is a conflict between the Fox standard and 
Rule 8(a)(2). The Fox standard requires a plaintiff seeking to invoke 
the discovery rule to “specifically plead facts” to show that the 
discovery rule applies with respect to a given cause of action.47 Rule 
8(a)(2), on the other hand, requires only that a plaintiff’s complaint 
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim.”48 Clearly there is a 
potential conflict between the two rules: the former requires 
 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 44. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988) (discussing “the 
supremacy of federal law” in the case of a collision between state law and federal law). 
 45. IDES ET AL., supra note 29, at 479. 
 46. See id. at 478. 
 47. Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 110 P.3d 914, 921 (Cal. 2005). 
 48. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
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specifically pled facts, while the latter requires only a short and plain 
statement of a claim.49 
 The issue then becomes whether a plaintiff is required to 
specifically plead facts pertaining to the delayed discovery rule in 
order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 8(a)(2) is broad enough 
to resolve this dispute, as it applies to all claims in federal court,50 with 
but a few exceptions.51 In short, there is a real conflict between Rule 
8(a)(2) and the Fox standard—the standards differ, and thus, both 
cannot govern the pleading requirements in federal court. 
b)  Is Rule 8(a)(2) Constitutionally Valid? 
Resolving this conflict between the Fox standard and Rule 8(a)(2) 
requires an analysis of whether Rule 8(a)(2) is constitutionally valid. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated pursuant to the 
Rules Enabling Act (REA), and must comply with the requirements of 
that statute to be valid.52 In section 2072(a) of the REA, Congress 
granted the Supreme Court the authority to promulgate the rules of 
“practice and procedure” for cases in lower courts.53 However, 
Congress also imposed a limit on the Court’s power to create 
procedural rules. Section 2072(b) of the Act states that “[s]uch rules 
shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”54 
Accordingly, to be valid, such a rule must (1) be “reasonably-
classifiable” as a rule of practice or procedure, and (2) must not 
abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right.55 A Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure that is valid under the REA is constitutional, and thus, 
applicable in federal court.56 
 
 49. Even in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, in which the Supreme Court applied something akin to a 
heightened pleading standard, the Court rejected a specificity requirement. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
The Court held that “absent overriding considerations pressing for a specificity requirement, as in 
the case of averments of fraud or mistake, the general ‘short and plain statement of the claim’ 
mandate in Rule 8(a) . . . should control.” Id. at 687 (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR 
R. MILLER, 5A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1301, at 291 (3d ed. 2004)). Thus, although 
Iqbal imposes a “plausibility” requirement on plaintiffs in federal court, the Court has not gone so 
far as to impose a “specificity” requirement. Id. at 663. 
 50. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). 
 51. See infra text accompanying notes 89–90. 
 52. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
 53. Id. § 2072(a). 
 54. Id. § 2072(b). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See supra text accompanying notes 39–42. 
(6)52.1_DONOHUE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2019  9:55 PM 
10 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1 
Rule 8(a)(2) is reasonably classifiable as a rule of practice or 
procedure. In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate 
Insurance Co.,57 the Court held that a rule “really regulat[es] 
procedure” when it “governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by 
which the litigants’ rights are ‘enforced.’”58 Rule 8(a)(2) governs the 
means and the manner by which a litigant’s rights are enforced by 
establishing the level of specificity with which plaintiffs must plead 
the substantive elements of their claims. 
Whether Rule 8(a)(2) “abridges, enlarges, or modifies” a 
substantive right presents a more complex question. In fact, the bounds 
of the analysis under section 2072(b) remains an open question in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia and 
Justice Stevens advanced differing interpretations of the analysis 
under section 2072(b).59 However, regardless of which is the correct 
standard, the analysis demonstrates that Rule 8(a)(2) is 
constitutionally valid. 
Under Justice Scalia’s approach from Shady Grove, Rule 8(a)(2) 
passes the validity test, as “it governs . . . ‘the manner and the means’ 
by which litigants’ rights are ‘enforced.’”60 In Justice Scalia’s view, 
the analysis ends there, and Rule 8(a)(2) is valid. It is noteworthy that 
no formal Federal Rule of Civil Procedure has ever failed to satisfy 
the “rule of practice or procedure” requirement of the REA.61 
Under Justice Stevens’s approach, after determining that the rule 
arguably governs procedure, the question becomes whether an 
application of Rule 8 would abridge, enlarge, or modify any 
substantive right in a significant manner,62 that is, whether the rule 
changes the litigants’ claims, or alters the available “remedies, 
including any applicable time limitations, available for that claim’s 
 
 57. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
 58. Id. at 407 (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946)). 
 59. Compare id. at 410 (Justice Scalia concluded that if a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure does 
in fact regulate procedure, the analysis ends there: “it is authorized by [the REA] and is valid in all 
jurisdictions, with respect to all claims, regardless of its incidental effect upon state-created 
rights.”), with id. at 424–25 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (Justice 
Stevens read the REA to require a court to engage in an analysis of whether a given procedural rule 
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive rights in order to determine its validity.). 
 60. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407. 
 61. IDES ET AL., supra note 29, at 483–84. 
 62. Id. at 484. 
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enforcement.”63 With regard to California’s delayed discovery rule, 
Rule 8 does no such thing. 
The delayed discovery rule’s function is to extend the window in 
which a plaintiff can sue to enforce a right in cases where the plaintiff 
does not discover the grounds for her claim until after the otherwise 
applicable statute of limitations has run.64 The only difference between 
Fox’s pleading standard and Rule 8(a)(2) is that the former requires a 
plaintiff to plead facts with specificity, whereas the latter requires only 
a short and plain recitation of the grounds on which he is invoking the 
delayed discovery rule. Viewed in this light, altering the pleading 
standard applicable to the delayed discovery rule does not abridge, 
enlarge, or modify any substantive rights. Nor does Rule 8(a)(2) 
extend the time limit available for the enforcement of a claim. Rather, 
Rule 8(a)(2) merely governs “‘the manner and the means’ by which 
litigants’ rights are ‘enforced’”65 by establishing the level of 
specificity with which plaintiffs must plead the substantive elements 
of their claims. 
In summary, Rule 8(a)(2) is valid under the Erie doctrine. The 
rule was enacted pursuant to the REA, it is “a rule of practice or 
procedure,” and finally, it does not abridge, enlarge, or modify any 
substantive rights. Thus, application of the Fox standard in federal 
court violates the Erie doctrine. Federal courts should abandon the Fox 
standard, and instead apply the pleading standards found in Rule 8 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in Rule 9 when applicable. 
B.  The Delegation Doctrine and Notice Pleading 
There is another related and compelling reason why federal courts 
should not apply the Fox pleading standard: federal courts do not have 
the constitutional authority to alter the rules of procedure in an ad hoc 
manner. As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s power to 
promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure derives from the 
REA.66 Section 2072(b) of the Act, in addition to the “abridge, enlarge 
or modify” clause, contains a suppression clause that reads: “All laws 
in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 110 P.3d 914, 920 (Cal. 2005). 
 65. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407. 
 66. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
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such rules have taken effect.”67 This delegation of rulemaking power 
from Congress to the Court falls within the scope of the Delegation 
doctrine.68 
The constitutionality of the Delegation doctrine has been a hot 
topic of debate among legal scholars and in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.69 A formalist critique of the Delegation doctrine is that 
the grant of quasi-legislative authority to the Court violates the 
separation of powers doctrine.70 “To formalists, the constitutional text 
and intent of the drafters are controlling, and they consider it 
inappropriate to consider changed circumstances or policy 
concerns.”71 Functionalists, on the other hand, focus more “on the core 
functions of each branch to determine whether those functions are 
threatened by the intrusion of another branch.”72 With regard to the 
creation of federal procedural law, the functionalist approach makes 
sense as a practical matter. The rulemaking process established by the 
REA is an example of coequal branches of government working 
together to address an issue that is not directly considered in the 
Constitution: the creation of procedural rules for Article III courts. It 
is axiomatic that the power to legislate in our constitutional system is 
held by the legislature. However, Congress has been delegating 
procedural rulemaking power to the federal courts since the nation’s 
founding.73 The Supreme Court’s promulgation of procedural rules 
pursuant to a delegation of congressional authority is well 
established,74 and such rules bear the stamp of approval of both the 
judiciary and the legislature.75 However, given that the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure are promulgated pursuant to a delegation of 
 
 67. Id. § 2072(b). 
 68. See Leslie M. Kelleher, Separation of Powers and Delegations of Authority to Cancel 
Statutes in the Line Item Veto Act and the Rules Enabling Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 412–
13 (2000). 
 69. See id. for a thorough discussion of the evolution of the delegation doctrine and its 
relationship with the separation of powers doctrine. 
 70. See id. at 414–23. 
 71. Id. at 415. 
 72. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976)). 
 73. See Alexander Volokh, Judicial Non-Delegation, the Inherent-Powers Corollary, and 
Federal Common Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1391, 1426 (2017) (citing the Judiciary Act of 1789 as an 
early example of Congressional delegation to the Court). 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975)) (“[L]imitations 
on delegation are ‘less stringent in cases where the entity exercising the delegated authority itself 
possesses independent authority over the subject matter.’”)). 
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congressional authority rather than an enumerated power of the 
judiciary, alteration of the rules is not something to be taken lightly, 
and certainly is not within the province of the federal district courts 
and courts of appeals.76 
C.  Leatherman and Notice Pleading 
 In light of the debate over the constitutionality of the Delegation 
doctrine, it is little wonder that the Supreme Court has consistently 
held that the pleading standards set forth in Rule 8 and Rule 9 cannot 
be altered from the bench, and that they apply with equal force in all 
cases, regardless of the circumstances of the case or the source of the 
underlying law.77 In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, the Supreme Court considered the 
heightened pleading standard applied by the Fifth Circuit in cases 
brought against government officials.78 Leatherman came before the 
Court in 1993, amidst a movement by lower federal courts to create 
common law exceptions to Rule 8(a)(2) by imposing heightened 
pleading requirements in certain types of actions.79 Given this 
historical context, the Leatherman Court’s defense of the notice 
pleading system is all the more powerful. 
In Leatherman, several plaintiffs sued a municipality under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging civil rights violations by various local officials 
and police officers.80 The District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas dismissed the complaint, because it found the plaintiffs failed 
to meet the “‘heightened pleading standard’ required by the decisional 
law of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.”81 The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal, the plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Court 
reversed.82 
 
 76. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012) (granting “the Supreme Court” the “power to prescribe 
general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district 
courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals”). 
 77. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant 
Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
 78. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 165. 
 79. IDES ET AL., supra note 29, at 37 (noting that, “commencing in the 1970s and picking up 
steam thereafter, lower federal courts” throughout the country began applying heightened pleading 
requirements in actions “deemed disfavored,” “in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” and in 
other cases that were “deemed complex.”). 
 80. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 165. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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The defendants in Leatherman argued that the District Court and 
the Fifth Circuit had not in fact applied a heightened pleading standard 
to the plaintiffs’ complaints.83 They further argued that “the degree of 
factual specificity required of a complaint by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure varies according to the complexity of the underlying 
substantive law.”84 The Court flatly rejected both of these arguments. 
With regard to the respondent’s first argument, the Court first 
examined the standard that the courts below had applied. That 
standard required plaintiffs in suits “against government officials 
involving the likely defense of immunity” to “state with factual detail 
and particularity the basis for the claim.”85 The standard’s demand for 
“factual detail and particularity” is far more demanding than Rule 
8(a)(2), which requires only a short and plain statement of the claim.86 
Furthermore, the standard’s focus on “factual detail” is at odds with 
the liberal notice pleading system embodied in the Federal Rules, and 
seems to demand even greater specificity than Rule 9, which requires 
only that “a party must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake.”87 The stark difference between 
Rule 8(a)(2) and the Fifth Circuit’s pleading standard prompted the 
Leatherman Court to conclude that “it is impossible to square the 
‘heightened pleading standard’ applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case 
with the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal 
Rules.”88 
After finding the Fifth Circuit’s pleading standard incompatible 
with the federal notice pleading standard, the Court proceeded to 
discuss the limited circumstances in which an exception to Rule 
8(a)(2) will apply. The Court made clear that there are two sets of 
circumstances in which Rule 8 will not govern a complaint in federal 
court.89 The first, when Rule 9 is triggered by allegations of fraud or 
mistake; the second, upon amendment of the Federal Rules.90 The 
 
 83. Id. at 167. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (emphasis added). 
 86. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 87. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 88. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. Although the Leatherman Court’s discussion of amendment to the Rules focused 
on formal amendment by the Advisory Committee, Congress also maintains the authority to create 
statutory exceptions to the rule. See IDES ET AL., supra note 29, at 37 (noting that Congress has 
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Court rooted its conclusion that pleading standards should not be 
altered from the bench in the structure of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Court noted that the sole exception to Rule 8(a)(2) in 
the Federal Rules is embodied in Rule 9.91 Accordingly, the Court 
found no basis in the Federal Rules for demanding that plaintiffs 
alleging municipal liability under section 1983 adhere to a heightened 
pleading standard. As the Court concluded, “Expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius.”92 
In sum, under Leatherman, federal courts may not impose a 
heightened pleading standard based on the nature of the substantive 
law at issue, nor can they alter the applicable pleading standard from 
the bench. Rule 8(a)(2) applies to all pleadings in federal court, unless 
(1) the plaintiff’s complaint implicates Rule 9, or (2) Congress has 
provided a statutory exception to the rule. With regard to California’s 
delayed discovery rule, no such exception applies. 
IV.  SOME EXAMPLES OF THE FOX STANDARD’S APPLICATION IN 
FEDERAL COURT 
Despite the doctrines and Supreme Court precedents that preclude 
the application of the Fox pleading standard in federal court, district 
courts within the Ninth Circuit continue to wrestle with how to apply 
Fox when considering California’s discovery rule. The confusion 
stems from the Ninth Circuit’s 1995 opinion in California Sansome 
Co. v. U.S. Gypsum.93 
A.  California Sansome Co. v. U.S. Gypsum 
 In Bonds v. Niccoletti Oil, Inc.,94 a district court in the Eastern 
District of California identified California Sansome Co. v. U.S. 
Gypsum as the reason that district courts within the Ninth Circuit 
sometimes apply a heightened pleading standard when considering 
California’s delayed discovery rule.95 In California Sansome Co., the 
Ninth Circuit found that “California law makes clear that a plaintiff 
must allege specific facts establishing the applicability of the 
 
created statutory exceptions to Rule 8(a) in several areas of law, most notably in the area of 
securities litigation). 
 91. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 55 F.3d 1402, 1407 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 94. No. CV-F-07-1600 OWW/DLB, 2008 WL 2233511 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2008). 
 95. Id. at *7 (citing Cal. Sansome Co., 55 F.3d at 1407). 
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discovery-rule exception.”96 Within the last decade, several district 
courts within the Ninth Circuit have either questioned whether 
California Sansome Co. is good law, or refused to apply a heightened 
pleading standard to the delayed discovery rule altogether. 
B.  Bonds v. Nicoletti Oil, Inc. 
For example, in 2008 the Nicoletti court found that “[i]t is unclear 
to what extent California Sansome Co. remains good law,” as “it was 
decided years before Swierkiewicz.”97 In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 
N.A.,98 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that district courts 
lack the power to apply a heightened or altered pleading standard.99 
The Nicoletti court also noted that, unlike under California law, 
“[u]nder federal law, the primary aim of the pleading requirements is 
to give fair notice to the other party.”100 Yet despite its recognition that 
Swierkiewicz, the Federal Rules, and the very nature of notice pleading 
dictate that the Fox standard is inapplicable in federal courts, the 
Nicoletti court stopped short of expressly disavowing the Fox 
standard. The court concluded its discussion of the applicable pleading 
standard by noting that, “[d]espite th[e] tension between notice 
pleading under Rule 8 and code pleading under California law, the 
applicable law places the burden on Plaintiffs to plead facts to justify 
delayed discovery.”101 
C.  Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding, AG 
In 2011, a district court in the Central District of California went 
so far as to reject the Fox standard outright, albeit in a footnote.102 In 
Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding, AG,103 the defendant argued that 
the Fox standard applied to the plaintiff’s attempt to invoke 
California’s delayed discovery rule.104 The court rejected this 
 
 96. Cal. Sansome Co., 55 F.3d at 1407. 
 97. Nicoletti, 2008 WL 2233511 at *7 (citing Cal. Sansome Co., 55 F.3d 1402; Swierkiewicz 
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 98. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).  
 99. Id. at 513 (“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with 
limited exceptions. Rule 9(b), for example, provides for greater particularity in all averments of 
fraud or mistake. This Court, however, has declined to extend such exceptions to other contexts.”). 
 100. Nicoletti, 2008 WL 2233511 at *7. 
 101. Id. at *8. 
 102. Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding, AG, No. 2:10-cv-04849-JHN-PLAx, 2011 WL 
13128155, *3 n.3. (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2011). 
 103. No. 2:10-cv-04849-JHN-PLAx, 2011 WL 13128155 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2011).   
 104. Id. at *3–4. 
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argument, holding that “the pleading requirements for a diversity case 
in federal court are governed by federal procedural law, not by state 
law.”105 However, the Yamada court’s approach has not gained much 
traction among the district courts. In fact, its rejection of Fox, couched 
in footnote 3 of the unpublished opinion, has been cited only once to 
date.106 
D.  Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc. 
A third case that questions the applicability of the Fox standard 
in federal court is Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc.107 In Yumul, the 
district court sent mixed messages regarding the pleading standard that 
it applied. The court began its discussion of the applicable pleading 
standard by stating that, “[i]n order to invoke [the delayed discovery 
exception] to the statute of limitations, the plaintiff must specifically 
plead facts” in support of the rule’s application.108 The court went on 
to reject the defendant’s argument that Rule 9(b) applies to allegations 
of delayed discovery, because “the [discovery] rule concerns no 
allegations of ‘fraud or mistake,’ and, . . . neither fraud nor mistake is 
required to prove delayed discovery.”109 Finally, without referencing 
its previous citation of the specifically-plead-facts standard, the court 
concluded that Rule 8(a)(2) applies to the pleading of delayed 
discovery.110 While Yumul ultimately applied Rule 8(a)(2) to the 
pleading of delayed discovery, its reference to Fox’s specificity 
requirement at the pleading stage contributes to the uncertainty 
regarding the appropriate pleading standard in such cases. 
Nicoletti, Yamada, and Yumul all criticize and reject use of the 
Fox standard to different degrees, but such cases are the exception 
within the Ninth Circuit rather than the norm. A majority of district 
courts within the Ninth Circuit that cite to Fox’s specifically-plead-
 
 105. Id. at *3 n.3. 
 106. See Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding, AG, Citing References, WESTLAW, https://1.next 
.westlaw.com/RelatedInformation/I48b8b820979711e69e6ceb9009bbadab/kcCitingReferences.ht
ml?docSource=a18966b1695e430c90dae2caa68b3a98&facetGuid=h562dbc1f9a5f4b0c9e54031a
19076b9c&originationContext=citingreferences&transitionType=CitingReferences&contextData
=%28sc.DocLink%29 (last visited March 8, 2018). 
 107. 733 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 108. Id. at 1141 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. at 1142. 
 110. Id. 
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facts standard continue do so without testing their approach against 
the Erie doctrine, the Delegation doctrine, and Leatherman.111 
E.  Recent Erosion of the Fox Standard in Federal Court 
1.  Regter v. Stryker Corporation 
The Ninth Circuit has yet to address a challenge to the Fox 
standard in depth. The closest the Ninth Circuit has come to 
disapproving of the Fox standard was in Regter v. Stryker Corp.112 The 
district court in Regter had dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint 
“because of a failure to allege specific facts to make applicable the 
California” delayed discovery rule.113 The Ninth Circuit’s 
unpublished, single-page memorandum opinion in Regter cited the 
Fox standard, but omitted the “specifically plead fact” language.114 
However, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the 
complaint, finding that the plaintiff had “adequately alleged that he 
was reasonably diligent in discovering the cause of his injury.”115 
In sum, the Ninth Circuit in Regter seems to have deliberately 
omitted the “specifically plead facts” language from the Fox standard. 
However, although the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had 
“adequately alleged” the elements of the delayed discovery rule, the 
court did not disavow the district court’s application of Fox’s 
heightened pleading standard. Thus, although the Regter court 
questioned the Fox standard implicitly, Regter by no means retires the 
Fox standard. 
 
 111. See, e.g., Bekins v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1220, 1225 (S.D. Cal. 2017) 
(applying the Fox standard to the plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the delayed discovery rule); Prods. 
and Ventures Int’l v. Axus Stationary (Shanghai) Ltd., No. 16-cv-00669-YGR, 2017 WL 4536250, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017) (noting that the court’s previous order of dismissal was based on 
the plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the Fox standard); Shamshina v. Anaco, No. 2:14-cv-01431-ODW, 
2015 WL 12672091, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2015) (citing the Fox standard without further 
comment of the applicable pleading standard); Adams v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., No. SACV 
12-969-JST (JPRx), 2013 WL 12113225, at *4–6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013) (dismissing the 
plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice for failure to satisfy the Fox standard). 
 112. 607 F. App’x 732 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 113. Regter v. Stryker Corp., No. 8:13-cv-00014-R, 2013 WL 12129612, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
21, 2013). 
 114. Regter, 607 F. App’x at 733. 
 115. Id. 
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2.  Strong v. Cochran 
At the time of writing, Fox and its discovery rule pleading 
standard have been cited by federal district courts in no less than 218 
cases.116 Of those, 210 were within the Ninth Circuit; the remaining 
eight were from various district courts throughout the country.117 
Although a handful of cases from district courts within the Ninth 
Circuit that cite the Fox standard question or reject its specifically-
plead-facts language,118 perhaps the most thorough refutation of Fox’s 
pleading standard comes from outside the Ninth Circuit. In Strong v. 
Cochran, the District Court for the District of Utah found the Fox 
standard inapplicable in federal courts under the Erie doctrine.119 As 
argued in Section III.B, supra, the Strong court’s outcome under Erie 
is correct. 
Of course, one benefit that the Strong court had that district courts 
within the Ninth Circuit do not is that it was free to disregard the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in California Sansome Co. As the district court in 
Nicoletti noted, the Ninth Circuit in California Sansome Co. 
effectively endorsed the Fox standard when it stated that California 
law makes clear that a “plaintiff must allege specific facts establishing 
the applicability of the discovery-rule exception.”120 However, as 
discussed supra, longstanding Supreme Court precedent demands that 
federal district courts adhere to the notice pleading system embodied 
in the Federal Rules, even when sitting in diversity.121 Thus, in the 
future, district courts within the Ninth Circuit should follow Strong in 
disregarding the discussion of California’s delayed discovery rule in 
California Sansome Co., insofar as it promotes the application of a 
heightened pleading standard. 
 
 116. Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., Citing References, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw. 
com/Link/RelatedInformation/DocHeadnoteLink?docGuid=Ic636cfb326c311daaea49302b5f61a3
5&headnoteId=200656713601320100105001014&originationContext=document&docSource=ba
3864a5441146bb8b317a35ee53dec6&rank=10&transitionType=CitingReferences&contextData=
(sc.History*oc.DocLink) (last visited Nov. 25, 2017). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See the discussion of Nicoletti, Yamada, and Yumul, supra at 116–117. 
 119. No. 2:14-cv-788-TC, 2017 WL 4620984, at *5 (D. Utah Oct. 13, 2017). 
 120. Bonds v. Nicoletti Oil, Inc., No. CV-F-07-1600 OWW, 2008 WL 2233511, at *7 (E.D. 
Cal. May 28, 2008) (quoting Cal. Sansome Co. v. U.S. Gypsum, 55 F.3d 1402, 1407 (9th Cir. 
1995)). 
 121. See the discussions of the Erie doctrine and Leatherman supra. 
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F.  The Importance of Applying the Correct Pleading Standard 
There are undoubtedly some instances in which a district court’s 
application of the Fox standard would lead to the same result as an 
application of Rule 8(a)(2). If, for example, a plaintiff’s complaint 
clearly shows on its face that the statute of limitations would have 
otherwise run, but includes no allegations as to the applicability of the 
delayed discovery rule or some other tolling doctrine, the complaint 
would not survive a 12(b)(6) motion under any pleading standard. It 
is the close cases in which application of the Fox standard will do real 
harm—the cases in which a plaintiff’s allegations regarding the 
delayed discovery rule fall somewhere within the gray void between 
plausible and implausible.122 In such cases, the pleading standard that 
the court applies may determine whether a plaintiff with a meritorious 
claim but limited knowledge of the facts surrounding her case ever 
makes it past the pleading stage of litigation. 
V.  THE PLAINTIFF’S BURDEN TO PLEAD DELAYED DISCOVERY 
 UNDER FOX 
Although it is error for federal courts to demand that plaintiffs 
adhere to Fox’s pleading standard, placing the burden on plaintiffs to 
show that the discovery rule applies is appropriate. That federal courts 
sitting in diversity should apply federal procedural law is but one side 
of the Erie coin. The other is that federal courts sitting in diversity are 
to apply state substantive law in adjudicating a plaintiff’s state law 
causes of action.123 
An open question raised by the application of the Fox standard in 
federal court is whether placing the burden to plead the elements of 
the delayed discovery rule on the plaintiff is a matter of substantive 
law, or one of procedural law. Precedent and practicality suggest it is 
a matter of substantive law. As such, federal courts sitting in diversity 
should defer to Fox’s allocation of the burden of pleading and proving 
delayed discovery. However, before addressing the federal precedent, 
a brief look at the California Supreme Court’s view of the relationship 
between statutes of limitation and the delayed discovery rule helps 
frame the analysis. 
 
 
 122. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that complaints in federal court 
must adhere to a “plausibility” standard in order to survive a motion to dismiss). 
 123. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965). 
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A.  California’s Balance of “Repose” and  
“Disposition on the Merits” 
In the seminal case of Norgart v. Upjohn Co.,124 the California 
Supreme Court engaged in a thorough analysis of the nature of statutes 
of limitations and their relationship to the delayed discovery rule. The 
court noted that “the affirmative defense based on the statute of 
limitations” has often “been approved by courts as ‘favored.’”125 This 
is because, the court explained, statutes of limitations “promote[] 
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs,” in accord 
with public policy.126 
The court also noted that, “[l]ess often, the affirmative defense 
based on the statute of limitations has been disparaged as ‘disfavored’ 
. . . because, contrary to ‘public policy’, it buys repose at the price of 
disposing of a cause of action ‘on procedural grounds’ rather than ‘on 
the merits.’”127 The court went on to state that “the affirmative defense 
based on the statute of limitations should not be characterized by 
courts as either ‘favored’ or ‘disfavored,’” because the public policies 
in favor of “repose and [] disposition on the merits [] are equally 
strong, the one being no less important or substantial than the 
other.”128 
The court then described how the tension between these two 
important public policies is ameliorated by the availability of the 
discovery rule. The public policy in favor of repose is not eviscerated 
by the discovery rule, because once a plaintiff suspects he has a cause 
of action, “he must indeed seek to learn the facts necessary to bring 
the cause of action in . . . — he ‘cannot wait for’ them ‘to find’ him 
and ‘sit on’ his ‘rights.’”129 Furthermore, the burden is on the plaintiff 
to plead why the discovery rule applies.130 At the same time, the public 
policy in favor of disposition on the merits is promoted by extending 
the date of accrual in cases where the plaintiff is “‘blamelessly 
ignorant’ of his cause of action.”131 Thus, the relationship between 
statutes of limitations and the discovery rule under California law 
 
 124. 981 P.2d 79 (Cal. 1999). 
 125. Id. at 87. 
 126. Id. (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)). 
 127. Id. (citations omitted). 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 88. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 93. 
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reflects a careful balancing of opposing public policies. As explained 
below, federal courts should honor that balance when adjudicating 
claims under California law, insofar as doing so does not conflict with 
federal procedural law. 
B.  The Error in Strong 
In Strong v. Cochran, the district court found that it was 
inappropriate to place the burden of pleading the applicability of 
California’s delayed discovery rule on plaintiffs.132 The court held that 
the “Fox [standard] does not apply in federal courts” because 
“expiration of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and 
[a plaintiff] does not have the burden to plead compliance with the 
statute of limitations.”133 The court concluded its discussion of Fox by 
stating that a “court may not hold [a plaintiff] to a rule requiring him 
to preemptively raise the statute of limitations in his complaint or 
otherwise affirmatively plead circumstances in anticipation of a statute 
of limitations defense.”134 As discussed below, there are several flaws 
in the Strong court’s analysis. 
1.  Palmer v. Hoffman and Rule 8(c) 
First, Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that “[i]n general[,] [i]n responding to a pleading, a party must state 
any . . . affirmative defense, including . . . statute of limitations.”135 
Shortly after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, the 
Supreme Court considered the question of which party to a suit must 
bear the burden of establishing contributory negligence, another of the 
affirmative defenses listed in Rule 8(c).136 In Palmer v. Hoffman,137 
the plaintiff/respondent argued that the courts below had been correct 
to place the burden of establishing contributory negligence on the 
defendant, “because of the fact that Rule 8(c) . . . makes contributory 
negligence an affirmative defense.”138 The Court disagreed. 
 
 132. No. 2:14-cv-788-TC, 2017 WL 4620984, at *5 (D. Utah Oct. 13, 2017). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 136. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); see FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 137. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).  
 138. Id. at 117. 
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Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous court, held that “Rule 
8(c) covers only the manner of pleading.”139 However, “[t]he question 
of the burden of establishing contributory negligence,” the Court held, 
is one of state law, which federal courts sitting in diversity must 
apply.140 Thus, while Rule 8(c) controls the manner in which 
contributory negligence must be pled, the burden of pleading and 
proving contributory negligence is controlled by state law. 
In light of the principle announced in Palmer, placing the burden 
of pleading and proving the applicability of the delayed discovery rule 
on the plaintiff is permissible in federal court. Like contributory 
negligence, the statute of limitations defense is among the affirmative 
defenses listed in Rule 8(c).141 As Palmer made clear, Rule 8(c) only 
governs the manner of pleading those defenses. Thus, if a defendant 
in federal court wishes to raise a defense based on the expiration of the 
statute of limitations, Rule 8(c) explains the proper procedure for 
doing so. However, allocation of the burden of pleading and proving 
the applicability of the delayed discovery rule is a matter of state law 
that federal courts sitting in diversity are bound to follow.142 
2.  The Function of the Fox Standard 
Another flaw in the Strong court’s analysis is that the court 
viewed the discovery rule as imposing a burden on plaintiffs to 
“preemptively raise the statute of limitations in his complaint or 
otherwise affirmatively plead circumstances in anticipation of a statute 
of limitations defense.”143 This is not the case. While a plaintiff is 
generally “not required to plead circumstances countering a 
defendant’s affirmative defense,”144 the delayed discovery rule is an 
exception to the general rule that takes the statute of limitation out of 
the realm of an affirmative defense.145 This much is clear from the text 
of the Fox standard. Under Fox, a plaintiff’s burden to plead the 
elements of the delayed discovery rule is only triggered when his 
“complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). 
 141. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 142. See Cal. Sansome Co. v. U.S. Gypsum, 55 F.3d 1402, 1406 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
under California law, “the burden is on [plaintiffs] to plead and prove the facts necessary to toll the 
limitations period once it is established that it would have otherwise commenced”). 
 143. Strong v. Cochran, No. 2:14-cv-788-TC, 2017 WL 4620984, at *5 (D. Utah Oct. 13, 2017). 
 144. Id. (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)). 
 145. See Cal. Sansome Co., 55 F.3d at 1406–07. 
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the benefit of the discovery rule.”146 This standard does not require a 
plaintiff to anticipate a potential statute of limitations defense; all it 
requires is that a plaintiff whose cause of action would otherwise be 
stale provide the court and the defendant notice as to why the delayed 
discovery rule should apply. 
A hypothetical scenario helps illustrate this point. Imagine 
Plaintiff, a citizen of state X, files suit against Defendant, a citizen of 
state Y, for breach of fiduciary duty in a federal district court situated 
in state Y in January 2017. The federal district court applies state Y’s 
substantive law, which dictates that the statute of limitations for a 
claim of breach of fiduciary duty is one year. In her complaint, 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached his fiduciary duty to Plaintiff 
in January 2012: five years before she filed suit, and four years after 
the statute of limitations expired. The complaint does not mention the 
delayed discovery rule, nor does it mention the statute of limitations 
at all. Assuming that Rule 8(a)(2) applies to Plaintiff’s complaint, can 
it be said that Plaintiff has stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty 
upon which relief can be granted? The answer, it seems, is no. 
A claim is a “group of operative facts giving rise to one or more 
rights of action.”147 Under the law of state Y, a plaintiff may bring a 
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty when she sues within one 
year of the occurrence of that breach. Thus, in our hypothetical case, 
Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted 
because under the applicable substantive law of State Y, relief can 
only be granted when a plaintiff sues within the one-year statute of 
limitations. This determination does not require the district court to 
consider a potential statute of limitations defense—it is based entirely 
upon a review of the plaintiff’s complaint. Accordingly, absent some 
extended tolling of the statute of limitations, Plaintiff has failed to state 
a claim under Rule 8(a)(2). 
Now assume that state Y has a delayed discovery rule identical to 
the one in California, and that the Fox standard governs the 
applicability of the rule. Plaintiff now has the chance to invoke the 
delayed discovery rule by alleging (1) when and how she discovered 
that Defendant breached his fiduciary duty, and (2) why she was 
unable to discover the breach earlier, despite reasonable diligence.148 
 
 146. Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 110 P.3d 914, 920–21 (2005). 
 147. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
 148. Fox, 110 P.3d at 920–21. 
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Contrary to the Strong court’s position, requiring a plaintiff to plead 
the elements of the delayed discovery rule is not the same as requiring 
a plaintiff to “allege that his claims were within the applicable statute 
of limitations.”149 Quite the opposite. The Fox standard requires a 
plaintiff to explain why, even though the face of her complaint shows 
that her claim was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations, 
she should be entitled to bring her claim nonetheless. 
In sum, both Palmer and an assessment of the nature and function 
of the delayed discovery rule demonstrate that federal courts should 
follow California law (embodied in the Fox standard) when it comes 
to allocating the burden of pleading the applicability of the delayed 
discovery rule. As Fox and California Sansome Co. make clear, 
however, a plaintiff need only “plead and prove the facts necessary to 
toll the limitations period”150 when her “complaint shows on its face 
that [her] claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery 
rule.”151 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The issues presented by application of the Fox standard in federal 
courts are complex on their face: the Fox standard contains a pleading 
standard, an allocation of the burden of pleading, and the elements that 
must be pled to meet that burden. As demonstrated above, breaking 
Fox down to its essential components and examining each in turn 
clarifies that parts of Fox apply in federal courts, and others do not. 
Fox’s pleading standard—which requires that plaintiffs 
“specifically plead facts”152—has no place in federal courts. As 
discussed supra in Part IV, despite California Sansome Co.’s apparent 
adoption of the specifically-plead-facts standard, federal courts should 
forgo application of Fox’s pleading standard under the Erie doctrine, 
the Delegation doctrine, and the principles announced in Leatherman. 
With regard to Fox’s allocation of the burden of pleading and 
proving the applicability of the delayed discovery rule, however, 
federal courts are correct to apply the Fox standard. As discussed 
supra in Part V, placing the burden on the plaintiff is appropriate under 
 
 149. Strong, 2017 WL 4620984, at *5 (quoting Stewart v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers, 16 F. Supp. 3d 783, 794 (S.D. Tex. 2014)). 
 150. Cal. Sansome Co., 55 F.3d at 1406. 
 151. Fox, 110 P.3d at 920–21. 
 152. Id. at 921. 
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Palmer and under an analysis of the function of Fox’s burden 
allocation in federal litigation. 
In conclusion, when a federal district court is faced with a motion 
to dismiss a complaint for failure to sufficiently plead the elements of 
California’s discovery rule, the court should proceed as follows. If the 
plaintiff’s complaint does not indicate that the statute of limitations 
applicable to her cause of action has run, then the motion should be 
denied. However, if the court finds that the face of the complaint does 
indicate that the statute of limitations on her cause of action has run, 
then the court should require the plaintiff to plead the two elements of 
the Fox standard—“(1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the 
inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable 
diligence.”153 In considering whether the plaintiff has sufficiently pled 
these two elements, the court need only determine whether the 
plaintiff has satisfied Rule 8(a)(2). Thus, the complaint need only 
include a “short and plain statement” as to how and when the plaintiff 
discovered her claim, and why she was unable to discover it earlier, 
despite reasonable diligence. 
 
 153. Id. at 920–21 (emphasis omitted) (quoting McKelvey v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 645, 651 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
